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I.  THOMAS PIKETTYÕS CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
Thomas PikettyÕs Capital in the Twenty-First Century1 has, in the words of Paul Krugman, 
Òtransformed our economic discourseÓ about wealth and inequality.2 It is difficult to think of 
a recent work of social science that has received as much attention, or had so much impact, 
both within academic debates and in terms of broader public discourse. PikettyÕs work clearly 
carries weighty implications not only for economics, but also for many neighboring 
disciplines, among which we can count political philosophy.3 Now that the dust has settled 
                                                
*For comments on ancestral versions of this article, or for helpful discussion of the issues it treats, I am grateful 
to Jenny Andersson, Catherine Audard, Michael Bennett, Chris Bertram, Juliana Bidadanure, Paul 
Bou-Habib, Geoffrey Brennan, Jurgen De Wispelaere, Leah Downey, Andrew Gamble, Arthur 
Goldhammer, Robert Goodin, Alex Gourevitch, Joe Guinan, Jacob Hacker, Alan Hamlin, Lisa Herzog, 
James Hickson, Andrew Hindmoor, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Jonathan Hopkin, Waheed Hussain, 
Mathew Lawrence, Mary Leng, Robert Lepenies, Emily McTernan, Ed Miliband, Nick Pearce, Kate 
Pickett, Thomas Piketty, Joshua Preiss, Howard Reed, Miriam Ronzoni, Michael Rosen, Paul Sagar, T. 
M. Scanlon, Christian Schemmel, Fabian Schuppert, Paul Segal, Liam Shields, Lucas Stanczyk, Alan 
Thomas, Philippe Van Parijs, Nicholas Vrousalis, Albert Weale, Daniel Weinstock, Stian Westlake, 
Stuart White, Karl Widerquist, Richard Wilkinson, Andrew Williams, Thad Williamson, Gabriel 
Wollner, and Lea Ypi. I am also grateful to audiences in Belgrade, London, Manchester, Montral, 
Paris, Sheffield, at the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften in Bad Homburg, and at the Political 
Theory Project at Brown University. Work related to this article was supported by both the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking (INET) and the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF), whose 
generous support I am delighted to acknowledge. 
1Piketty 2014a; references to this book in the main text are indicated by ÒC.Ó 
2Krugman 2017, p. 71. 
3Responses to Piketty have come from law (Grewal 2014; Moyn 2014; Purdy 2014; Murphy 2015), from 
sociology (Savage 2014), from political science (Hopkin 2014), and from political theory and political 
philosophy (Vrousalis 2015; Widerquist 2015; Wollner 2015; Allen 2016; Anderson 2016; Bertram 
2016; Ronzoni 2015, 2016; Thomas 2016). As Piketty mischievously put it, regarding the critical 
response to his book, Òthe more interesting critiques come from social scientists outside economics, 
who read books more carefully, generally speakingÓ (Goldhammer and Piketty 2016, p. 68). 
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after the initial round of scholarly engagement with PikettyÕs book, and after Piketty himself 
has had the opportunity to refine and finesse the central points of his analysis in a slew of 
post-Capital writings,4 the time is ripe for an assessment of the bookÕs full significance from 
the standpoint of political philosophy, and to consider its full implications in terms of how we 
should think about public policy. 
In this article I will examine the main conceptual, historical, and normative claims of 
PikettyÕs Capital, and show how the book provides an important impetus towards an 
egalitarian research agenda in political philosophy and public policy. I begin in sections II 
through IV by considering PikettyÕs main conceptual and historical claims about the 
dynamics of inequality. In section V, I consider the normative commitments of PikettyÕs 
account of inequality, look at the (partially submerged or implicit) ways in which Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century can itself be read as a work of political philosophy, and relate 
PikettyÕs egalitarianism to philosophical accounts of the badness of socio-economic 
inequality. Section VI addresses some aspects of the general significance of Capital for the 
discipline of political philosophy. Finally, sections VII and VIII consider a range of strategies 
for egalitarian public policy, showing the role of political philosophy in laying out the space 
of possible alternative approaches, and maps an agenda for future research. 
 
 
II.  PIKETTY ON THE LAWS OF CAPITALISM 
 
PikettyÕs basic account of the Òfundamental lawsÓ of capitalism is relatively straightforward, 
and it provides the background explanation to his account of the strongest force for 
ÒdivergenceÓÑthat is, for greater inequalityÑwithin capitalist economies over time. It would 
be useful, therefore, to begin with PikettyÕs account of capitalismÕs Òfundamental laws.Ó 
 
PikettyÕs First Fundamental Law of Capitalism:  α = r x β 
 
This first law links the share of income from capital5 in national income, α, to the 
capital/income ratio, β. PikettyÕs first law simply tells us that the share of overall income 
                                                
4See Piketty 2014b, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015g, 2015h, 2016, 2017 and Goldhammer and Piketty 2016. 
5Much ink has been spilt on the definition of what counts as Òcapital,Ó and there has been some criticism of 
Piketty for eliding the categories of capital (conceived of as a factor of production) and wealth more 
generally (which includes assets that may have no productive use) (see Galbraith 2014). These 
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within an economy that accrues to capital (rather than to labor) is the product of the rate of 
return on capital, r, and the size of the capital stock expressed as its value as a multiple of one 
year of national income. The idea is simple enough: if the value of the capital stock is, say, 
around 600% of yearly income, meaning a β of 6 (roughly the level in Europe in the early 
twentieth century6), then a rate of return on capital of 5% would mean that returns to capital 
would account for 30% of national income (that is, 5% multiplied by the capital/income ratio 
of 6). If, on the other hand, the value of the capital stock were closer to, say 300% of annual 
income (that is, a capital/income ratio of 3), as was its approximate level in the Europe of the 
immediate post-war period, then a rate of return of capital of the same 5% would deliver a 
capital share of national income of only 15% (leaving 85% as labor income).  
PikettyÕs Òfirst law of capitalismÓ is not a law in the sense of a general empirical 
regularity, but is in fact simply an accounting identity. It is important nevertheless for making 
clear this relationship between the capital/income ratio and the share of national income 
going to capital rather than to wages. Given that capital is held so unevenly, with prior 
inequalities of wealth in general much greater than inequalities in labor income, we may have 
reason to be concerned about a substantial shift in the share of national income going as 
capital returns. If we are concerned about the inequalities that might be associated with an 
increasing capital share of national income, then we need to examine what determines the 
capital/income ratio in the long run. This brings us to PikettyÕs second Òfundamental law.Ó 
 
PikettyÕs Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism:  β = s/g 
 
This second law states that, in the long run, the capital/income ratio (that is, the size of 
the capital stock relative to one year of national income) is positively related to the rate of 
savings, s, and negatively related to the rate of growth of the economy as a whole (that is, the 
rate of growth in national income). What this shows us, as Piketty puts it, is that Òa country 
that saves a lot and grows slowly will over the long run accumulate an enormous stock of 
capital (relative to its income), which can in turn have a significant effect on the social 
structure and distribution of wealth. Let me put it another way: in a quasi-stagnant society, 
                                                                                                                                                  
controversies are outside the scope of the present discussion. For the sake of the argument of this 
article, I shall be relying on Robert SolowÕs judgment that this is only Òa small ambiguityÓ and that Òas 
long as we stick to longer-run trends, as Piketty generally does, this difficulty can safely be 
disregardedÓ (Solow 2017, pp. 49Ð50). 
6See Piketty 2014a, p. 165, fig. 5.2. 
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wealth accumulated in the past will inevitably acquire disproportionate importanceÓ (C, p. 
166). 
While the first fundamental law is simply an accounting identity, the second 
fundamental law is quite differentÑit is, as Piketty puts it, an Òasymptotic lawÓ (C, p. 168), 
regarding the long-term trend in the capital-income ratio of a society, for a given level of 
savings and a given level of economic growth. Obviously the capital stock takes years or 
even decades to build up, so β = s/g indicates a long-run equilibrium at which that capital 
stock will be stable as a multiple of national income, rather than a specification of its level at 
any one point. To illustrate how this equilibrium would be achieved, consider conditions 
under which the overall savings rate is 10% of national income, and the rate of growth of the 
economy is just 1%. Under such conditions, the equilibrium level for the capital/income ratio 
would be at 10:1, that is, for the capital stock to be worth ten times national annual income. 
This 10:1 level would represent a stable resting point for this level of savings and growth 
because, if we imagine the capital ratio being under 10:1, then a saving rate of 10% of 
national income would constitute more than a 1% addition to the stock of capital, which 
would therefore grow quicker than national income as a whole. Conversely, if the 
capital/income ratio (under these conditions) were above 10:1, then 10% of national income 
would constitute less than 1% of existing wealth, and therefore the growth in the value of the 
capital stock would be less than the growth in national income, and correspondingly the 
capital/income ratio would fall back down towards its equilibrium level. 
When combined by substitution, PikettyÕs two Òlaws of capitalismÓ give this equation 
showing the relationship between the capital share (α), the rate of return on capital, the 
savings rate, and the growth rate of the economy:  
 
The Piketty Equation:  α =
#	%	&
∋
 
 
Let us call this the Piketty Equation. It tells us that the share of national income going 
to capital (α) rather than to labor will tend towards an equilibrium level determined by the 
product of the savings rate and the rate of return to capital, divided by the rate of growth of 
the economy as a whole. Put simply, the higher the value of r and s, and the lower the value 
of g, the more income will accrue to the holders of wealth rather than to those who work for a 
living.  
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Now, if the distribution of wealth were not itself so inegalitarian (and thereby itself a 
matter for acute political concern), then there would be nothing about an increase in the 
proportion of national income going to capital rather than to labor that would give us pause to 
worry. In an economic model peopled by representative agents who derive common 
proportions of their income from labor and from investment returns, one might even think 
that such a shift in the capital share of national income would be straightforwardly good 
news. In a society where most or all citizens drew their income from both labor and capital, 
with holdings of capital broadly dispersed throughout society, a rise in the capital share of 
national income would carry the welcome implication that individuals could happily come to 
be less fully reliant on their labor income then they would be in a world with a less valuable 
capital stock, in which everyone had to work the better part of their living.7 Considering a 
rising capital share Piketty remarks Ò[i]n one respect, this is good news: capital is potentially 
useful to everyone, and provided that things are properly organized, everyone can benefit 
from it. In another respect, however, what this means is that the owners of capitalÑfor a 
given distribution of wealthÑpotentially control a larger share of total economic resourcesÓ 
(C, p. 167). 
But of course such a world of happy representative agents, sharing a common split 
between labor and capital income, is not any world even approximately close to the world 
that we inhabit ourselves.8 In fact, as Piketty explains, Òin every country and time period for 
which we have data, wealth distribution within each age group is substantially more unequal 
than income distribution.Ó9 A background of significant wealth inequality is not a merely 
local or passing phenomenon, but a pervasive feature of every society at every time period 
for which data is available. And so the reason that we should be troubled by a rising value for 
α, is that in the process of the capital/income ratio rising, we see an amplification of pre-
existing wealth inequalities, and therefore also an amplification of pre-existing inequalities in 
the degree to which individuals can achieve a given level of income from investments rather 
than from labor market participation.  
                                                
7Piketty 2016, pp. 93Ð4; see also Piketty 2015b, pp. 73Ð5. 
8Anthony Atkinson notes that the Òconventional wisdomÓ in economics often makes use of such representative-
agent models. Atkinson, like Piketty, thinks that we should instead ask ÒWho gains and who loses?Ó As 
Atkinson (2015, p. 5) puts it, ÒThis is a question that is often missing from todayÕs media discussion 
and policy debate. Many economic models assume identical representative agents carrying out 
sophisticated decision-making, where distributional issues are suppressed, leaving no space to consider 
the justice of the resulting outcome. For me, there should be room for such discussion. There is not just 
one Economics.Ó  
9Piketty 2016, p. 94; 2015b, p. 74. 
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Insofar as we are concerned about inequality, we therefore have very good reason to be 
interested in changes in the value of α, because a rising capital share will be associated with 
an entrenchment and exacerbation of background inequalities. Given this, we also have 
reason to be interested in the values of r, s, and gÑthat is, of the rate of return on capital, the 
savings rate, and the rate of growth of the economyÑas these values together are what 
determine the equilibrium level of the capital share. It is worth noting here that seeing α as a 
variable that is likely to vary change significantly over time is a matter of considerable 
significance, for it had been a general assumption of much twentieth century 
macroeconomics that the capital-labor split in national income was remarkably constant, with 
its stability being treated as, in Nicholas KaldorÕs terms, as a Òstylized factÓ of 
macroeconomics.10 John Maynard Keynes talked about the regularity of the labor-capital split 
in national income as a Òone of the most surprising, yet best-established, facts in the whole of 
economic statistics.Ó11 PikettyÕs analysis of historical changes in the value of the variables 
that determine α have dethroned that assumption about these stylized economic facts, thereby 
forcing the issue of the distribution of economic rewards between capital and labor forcefully 
onto the agenda.12 It is to the issue of the historical development of these variables that I now 
turn. 
 
 
III.  THE HISTORY (AND FUTURE) OF CAPITALISM? R > G 
 
The claim that r > gÑa mathematical inequality now so well-known that one can buy mugs 
and T-shirts on which it is emblazoned13Ñrepresents as Piketty puts it Òthe principal 
destabilising forceÓ under capitalism (C, p. 571), by which he means the principle force 
towards greater inequality. It is the claim that the return on capital (that is, the rate of 
investment return to capital holders on their investments), r, is greater than the rate of growth 
                                                
10In Kaldor 1961. For an early skeptical view on the stability of factor shares, see Solow (1958). More recently, 
developing insights from Kalecki (1943) the work of Andrew Glyn called into question the stability of 
factor shares, with his analysis of the Òprofit squeezeÓ of the 1960s and Õ70s. See: Glyn and Sutcliffe 
1972; Glyn 2009; Atkinson 2009; White 2008b, 2009; and Van Parijs 1995, p. 291, fn. 28. 
11Keynes 1939, p. 48. See also Piketty 2015a, p. 40. 
12It is interesting to see that Piketty himself treated the stability of the labor-capital split as just such a reliable 
background fact in his earlier book (Piketty 1997; 2015a), where he claimed that ÒIt appears that 
profits and wages always divide in such a way to award one-third of national income to capital and 
two-thirds to labour.Ó (Piketty 2015a, p. 40) The empirical data marshalled in Capital in the Twenty-
First Century banishes that previous impression of a historically stable split between factor incomes. 
13Goldhammer 2017. 
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of the economy, g, and that, therefore, the fundamental tendency of capitalism in the long-run 
is towards an extremely high level of economic inequality. Now, it may be that this claim has 
in fact received disproportionate attention for, although Piketty does emphasize its 
significance, he also says the he Òdoes not view r > g as the only or even primary tool for 
considering changes in income and wealth in the twentieth century, or for forecasting the path 
of inequality in the twenty-first century.Ó14 But in any case the relationship between growth 
and capital returns is clearly of central concern to anyone interested in the dynamics of 
capitalism and in the distributive consequences of those dynamics. 
PikettyÕs historical analysis shows that, for most of recorded human history, this 
inequality has held. In some ways, this is not at all surprising, as can be seen by considering 
the situation where the reverse inequality were to hold, and where r < g in the long-run. 
Where that reverse inequality held, capital holders would need to keep re-investing at a rate 
higher than the return they received from their capital holdings, in order to ensure that the 
size of their capital stock kept pace with the growth of the economy. Under such conditions, 
were they to obtain over time, rather than being the result of a particular external shock, one 
would likely judge that there had been an over-accumulation of capital, and it would seem 
reasonable for capital holders to disinvest at least part of their capital holdings.  
PikettyÕs reconstruction (and extrapolation) of the historical development of r and g at 
the global scale, based on the available data, gives a picture in which for most of human 
history, the level of g was very low, staying below 1% from the first millennium CE until the 
beginning of the industrial revolution, while the level of r remained steady at somewhere 
around 4Ð5% over the same period. While the level of g rose steadily from the industrial 
revolution to the second half of the twentieth century, reaching about 2% by the eve of the 
First World War, and accelerating to over 3% in the decades after the Second World War, the 
level of g went in the opposite direction, plummeting from its historical baseline around 5% 
to a level of around 1% during 1913Ð50, and then staying below the rate of g during the post-
war period, only recovering to around 4% in the twenty-first century.15 Thus, the great 
exception to the long-run conditions of r > g was the middle period of the twentieth century, 
during which economic growth accelerated while the rate of return to capital fell 
precipitously, as the result of a unique concatenation of factors, not least of which was the 
capital destruction involved in the period of two world wars. In this period, with r falling 
                                                
14Piketty 2016, p. 92. 
15See Piketty 2014a, fig. 10.10, p. 356. 
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sharply and g rising, inequality fell drastically. As summarizes, Òthe inequality r > g has 
clearly been true throughout most of human history, right up to the eve of World War I, and it 
will probably be true again in the twenty-first century. Its truth depends, however, on the 
shocks to which capital is subject, as well as on what public policies and institutions are put 
in place to regulate the relationship between capital and laborÓ (C, p. 358). 
Now, if we cast our minds back to the equation describing the equilibrium level of the 
capital share, α, we recall that it varies positively with the rate of return to capital, r, and the 
savings rate, s, and negatively with the rate of growth of the economy, g. Therefore, what 
matters for setting the level of α (if we, for the time being, hold the savings rate constant) is 
not so much the mere fact that r > g, as the comparative magnitude of the two variables, and 
the difference between them (that is, the size of r Ð g), given that the force towards greater 
inequality would be relatively weak if the difference between the two magnitudes were 
relatively small. As Piketty puts it, Òthe finite inequality level will be a steeply rising function 
of the gap r Ð g. Intuitively, a higher gap between r and g works as an amplifier mechanism 
for wealth inequality for a given variance of other shocks. To put it differently: a higher gap 
between r and g allows an economy to sustain a level of wealth inequality that is higher and 
more persistent over time (that is, a higher gap r Ð g leads both to higher inequality and lower 
mobility).Ó16 To render the significance of the r Ð g gap vivid, Piketty shows how even a 
small shift in the gap can correspond to a huge shift in the level of wealth inequality. A shift 
from a gap of 2% to a gap of 3% would, Piketty tells us, Ò[correspond] to a shift from an 
economy with moderate wealth inequalityÑsay, with a top 1 percent wealth share of 20Ð30 
percent, such as present-day Europe or the United StatesÑto an economy with very high 
wealth inequality with a top 1 percent wealth share of around 50Ð60 percent, such as pre-
World War I Europe.Ó17  
The potential for runaway wealth inequality in a world where overall economic growth 
is stagnant, but where capital returns through rents, corporate profits, and other avenues 
remain comparatively robust, is stark and disturbing. Indeed, PikettyÕs prognosis is a 
potentially bleak one: ÒIn the future, several forces might push towards a higher r Ð g gap 
(particularly the slowdown of population growth, and rising global competition to attract 
capital).Ó18 Given the sensitivity of outcomes in terms of wealth inequality to even small 
changes in the r Ð g gap, this presents a strikingly worrisome prospectus. Wealth inequality 
                                                
16Piketty 2015b, p. 75; 2016, p. 95. 
17Piketty 2015b, pp. 75Ð6; 2016, pp. 95Ð6. 
18Piketty 2016, p. 96.
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may be a disfiguring feature of modern capitalism, but the signs seem to be pointing towards 
a far deeper level of future wealth inequalityÑa return to something akin to a global Belle 
poque. 
What, then, was so special about the middle of the twentieth century when, for the very 
first time, a comparatively egalitarian form of capitalism emerged and even came to seem 
normal? If we are able to see clearly what happened during this period, before the return of 
capitalismÕs inegalitarian dynamics, then we could, perhaps, have a better idea of how to 
reform our current economic system so as to create a more equitable form of economic life. 
PikettyÕs diagnosis of the causal origins of the exceptional changes of the early-to-mid 
twentieth century is a complicated one: ÒDuring the 20th century, it is a very unusual 
combination of events which transformed the relation between r and g (large capital shocks 
during the 1914Ð1945 period, including destruction, nationalization, inflation; high growth 
during the reconstruction period and demographic transition; higher bargaining power for 
organized labor).Ó19 As we can see, among this heterogeneous set of factors, some depressed 
r while others raised g; some could be recreated via changes in public policy, while others 
(such as the demographic transition) were one-off occurrences; and others, in particular the 
appalling destruction of two world wars, which devastated EuropeÕs capital stock as well as 
its people, were disastrous historical events which had long-run consequences in reducing the 
economic domination of capital over labor. (Terrible historical events can sometimes have 
just such positive side-effects in terms of lessening economic inequality: the Black Death of 
1348Ð49 drove-up the bargaining power of surviving laborers, thereby increasing the labor 
income that they were able to command.) 
The lessons that can be drawn from the Òegalitarian exceptionalismÓ of the early-to-mid 
twentieth century are therefore rather mixed. The pessimistic conclusion to draw would be to 
think that an inclusive, relatively egalitarian form of capitalism, which many of us would 
have been ready to imagine as the constantly accessible default option for how advanced 
economies function, can actually be seen as a historical anomaly, made possible only in the 
wake of a terrible period of sustained international conflict and capital destruction. On the 
other hand, decisions to nationalize, tax or regulate private capital, to run monetary policy in 
a way that would allow moderate inflation, or to regulate labor unions in a way that created a 
framework for robust collective bargaining, were political decisions about public policy, not 
ÒexternalÓ shocks working their way through the economic system.  
                                                
19Piketty 2016, p. 96. 
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It may therefore be an uphill task to tame the inegalitarian tendencies of capitalism 
during the twenty-first century, but we are not helpless in the face of blind economic forces 
that we are unable to control. The values of r, s, and g are each responsive to a broad mixture 
of causal factors, some of which are beyond the control of political decision-making, but 
others of which are within our reach to modulate.  
Before turning to an assessment of possibly strategies for taming economic inequality, I 
want first to examine PikettyÕs treatment of the other, secondary mechanisms for driving up 
inequality, separate from the rise in the capital share. The parallel operation of these 
secondary inegalitarian forces will need to be taken into account in how we assess the relative 
plausibility and attractiveness of different imaginable forms of egalitarian public policy.  
 
 
IV.  PIKETTY ON THE OTHER INEGALITARIAN PATHOLOGIES OF CAPITALISM: 
ÒSUPERMANAGERSÓ AND ÒSUPERINVESTORSÓ 
 
As we have seen above, in PikettyÕs account of the inegalitarian trends of contemporary 
capitalism, the centerpiece of the historical story is the long-run change in the capital share of 
national income, α. This measure was high during the nineteenth century Belle poque, but 
then fell considerably during the era of the two world wars, remaining low during the Trentes 
Glorieuses of the immediate post-war years, but then taking off again in the period from the 
late nineteen seventies onwards. But alongside this there are two other parallel mechanisms 
driving greater inequality, operating within the pattern of returns to each factor of production. 
We see in recent capitalist economies a growing inequality within labor income, in particular 
with a small group at the top of the distribution of labor incomes pulling away from the rest. 
Alongside this, there is also a divergence in capital returns between bigger and smaller 
investors, with those who already have substantial holdings of capital seeing a much bigger 
return on their investments than do those who have only small investments. Thus, just as the 
rise in the value of α shifts economic rewards from labor to capital, so at the same time the 
profile of economic rewards within the income distribution become increasing skewed to the 
top end, while the pattern of investment returns across capital owners also develops in a way 
that concentrates and exacerbates existing inequalities. I will briefly discuss both parts of 
these parallel secondary dynamics of inequality, starting with the case of runaway inequality 
in labor incomes. 
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A.  Inequality of Labor IncomeÑThe Case of  
ÒSupermanagersÓ 
 
PikettyÕs book has a trans-Atlantic focus, with the two countries put under closest scrutiny 
being the United States and France. In the US, despite the background effects of a rising 
capital share of national income, the largest part of the explanation for increased income 
inequality since 1980 has actually been due to the vertiginous acceleration of inequalities in 
the distribution of labor income, with the largest effects being attributable to the way in 
which the top end of the distribution has broken away from the rest.20 The immediate cause 
for this remarkable change in the income distribution has been the advent of 
Òsupermanagers,Ó that is, top executives of large firms who have managed to obtain 
extremely high, historically unprecedented compensation packages for their laborÓ (C, p. 
302).  
The emergence of ÒsupermanagersÓ has a number of distinct explanations, each of 
which probably does some independent explanatory work. One striking contributory factor is 
the increasing size of the financial sector, with Piketty noting that Òthe financial professions 
(including both managers of banks and other financial institutions and traders operating on 
the financial markets) are about twice as common in the very high income groups as in the 
economy overall (roughly 20 percent of the top 0.1 percent, whereas finance accounts for less 
than 10 percent of GDP [in the United States])Ó (C, p. 303).21  
Another factor is ideological, with the transformation of norms around top incomes in 
the financial and corporate sectors, associated with what Piketty calls an ideal of a 
ÒhypermeritocraticÓ society, Òor,Ó as he puts it with an admirably deadpan skepticism, Òat any 
rate a society that the people at the top like to describe as hypermeritocraticÓ (C, p. 265). His 
idea here seems to be that the general acceptance of such very large salaries as rewards for 
merit itself can both explain why corporate executives would feel able to seek and accept 
such salaries, and why they might be regarded by the broader society as being justified in 
having done so, for Òit is hardly surprising that the winners in such a society would wish to 
describe the social hierarchy in this way [i.e., as rewarding individual merit], and sometimes 
they succeed in convincing some of the losersÓ (C, p. 265). 
                                                
20See, e.g., Piketty 2014a, p. 300, fig. 8.8. 
21On broader issues of the interlinked growth of the financial sector and levels of economic inequality, see 
Turner 2015. 
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A third factor is down to changes in the tax system, with a decline in taxation of top 
labor incomes in the period since the late 1970s, not only in the United States but also in 
other countries. Interestingly, PikettyÕs analysis of the effects of changes in top income 
taxation across different jurisdictions, involving joint work with Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie 
Stantcheva, shows that the most powerful effects of lowering marginal tax rates on high 
incomes are not perhaps the effects that would strike us first, or those which receive most 
political attention.22 For it isnÕt just that reductions in top tax rates increase the net income of 
corporate executives at any particular pay level, but that the reduction of top marginal rates 
gives these elite workers a strong incentive to bargain harder for ever higher salaries. When 
top rates were at 80Ð90 per cent, executives had little incentive to push up their pay at the 
margins, or in persuading others that such raises would be justifiable, instead making do with 
the already more-than-adequate material rewards of their jobs combined with the social 
prestige and economic power that goes with a senior managerial occupation. But with the 
decline in top marginal rates, Òafter 1980, the game was utterly transformed, however, and 
the evidence suggests that executives went to considerable lengths to persuade other 
interested parties to grant them substantial raisesÓ (C, p. 510).  
As this suggests, the fiscal and ideological origins of the rise of the ÒsupermanagersÓ 
are not so much fully distinct explanations as complementary explanations that create a 
certain degree of mutual feedback. Whatever the fine-grained explanations of why top pay 
has taken off in the United States (and to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom), Piketty and 
his co-authors make a powerful and convincing case for a Òbargaining theoryÓ as an 
alternative to the standard marginal productivity theory of economic orthodoxy. As they 
show, we have decisive reasons to reject the standard economistsÕ view of top pay, not least 
given the formidable epistemic barriers to determining what the marginal contribution of 
corporate managers or other very highly paid workers actually is, at least outside of specific 
domains such as the entertainment industry or professional sports. Piketty seems barely to be 
suppressing a sardonic smile when he describes marginal productivity theory as Òsuffering 
from a certain navet É when it comes to explaining how pay is determined at the top of the 
income hierarchyÓ (C, p. 509). (One might think that disingenuousness was as likely as 
navet.) In any event, his conclusion is thatÑcontrary to the claims embedded in the 
ideology of ÒhypermeritocracyÓÑthese increases do not Òhave much to do with a 
hypothetical increase in managerial productivityÓ (C, p. 512). 
                                                
22Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva 2014. See also Segal 2014, esp. p. 141. 
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B.  ÒSuperinvestorsÓÑInequalities in Capital Returns 
 
Whatever the economics textbooks might tell us about the theoretical efficiency of a well-
operating system of financial intermediation, it is perhaps not any great surprise to discover 
that wealthier, better-connected investors will systematically do better in terms of the returns 
that they see on their investments than will smaller, less sophisticated investors. As Piketty 
puts it, Òthere is the fact that a very large portfolio can manage to get a 7 or 8 per cent return, 
whereas people with £100,000 can hardly get the inflation rate.Ó23 This seems obviously to 
get at an important truth about how the economy works, but it is a particularly difficult truth 
to establish beyond doubt because, although it is easy enough to discover the kinds of capital 
returns that are available to retail investors in high street financial products, or even buy-to-
let landlords, it is very difficult to know quite how well the worldÕs richest investors are 
doing. Such individuals are understandably reluctant, in the absence of compulsion, to 
publish detailed records of the performance of their portfolios.  
One of the empirical triumphs of Capital is to put that plausible hunch, about how 
financial intermediation serves different investors more or less well in proportion to their 
existing wealth, onto a sound footing. PikettyÕs examination of returns on university 
endowments, which unlike rich private individual investors do actually publish good records 
of their investment performance, duly shows that absolute size matters when it comes to the 
rate of capital return (what we might think of as their own private level of r) that different 
institutional investors can expect to reap. In what must be one of the most arresting and 
significant tables in a book full of extraordinary charts and statistics, Piketty shows that, 
whereas the worldÕs richest universities, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, have averaged a 
capital return (after management fees and inflation) of 10.2% per annum during the period 
1980Ð2010, and the sixty U.S. universities with endowments over $1 billion have averaged a 
return of 8.8%, those five hundred institutions with endowments of less than $100 million 
have averaged a return of only 6.2%, much closer to the rates that mere retail investors could 
have commanded over the same period.24 
                                                
23See OÕNeill and Pearce 2014, at p. 104.  
24See Piketty 2014a, table 12.2, at p. 448. 
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The combination of the rise of the ÒsupermanagersÓ and the rise of the 
Òsuperinvestors,Ó both associated with the enlargement of the financial sector during the past 
thirty years, creates two powerful additional forces towards greater inequality. Both operate 
in particular at the top end of the distributions of income and wealth, attenuating the 
distribution of both labor income and investment income so as to benefit the richest and most 
successful, advantaging the top 1% of recent notoriety and, in particular, the top 0.1%.25 
These twin processes can be seen as superchargers placed on top of the main engine of 
growing inequalityÑthat is, the rise of the capital share that has been discussed in the 
previous section. The composite effect of these different processes working in tandem is to 
threaten a twenty-first century that may well be even more inegalitarian that the nineteenth 
(see C, pp. 375Ð6). 
We have now laid out PikettyÕs general account of the laws of capitalism, his account 
of some significant trends in capitalismÕs history, and his account of the driving forcesÑboth 
primary and secondaryÑbehind growing inequality. I turn now to questions of the 
significance of inequality.  
 
 
V.  WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS: PIKETTY AS POLITICAL  
PHILOSOPHER  
 
Piketty is an economist rather than a philosopher, and his book, while it displays a number of 
interesting normative commitments, does not engage in a sustained way with the literature in 
political philosophy. Despite the apparent homage in the title of his book, PikettyÕs treatment 
of the work of Marx is relatively brisk, emphasizing the shortcomings of a writer who 
Òprobably suffered É from having decided on his conclusions in 1848, before embarking on 
the research needed to justify them,Ó and casting a cool but scathing empiricistÕs eye on the 
nineteenth century namesake of Capital, which ÒMarx evidently wrote in great political 
fervor, which at times led him to issue hasty pronouncements from which it was difficult to 
escapeÓ (C, p. 10). PikettyÕs scorn for more recent Marxist thinkers is much hotter, saying of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, and Alain Badiou that Òone sometimes has the impression 
that questions of capital and class inequality are of only moderate interest to them and serve 
mainly as a pretext for jousts of a different nature entirelyÓ (C, p. 655).  
                                                
25See Stiglitz 2011, 2012. 
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PikettyÕs positive references to the work of political philosophers are rather limited. 
There is an approving citation of Jacques RancireÕs La Haine de la Democratie, endorsing 
RancireÕs Òexigent attitude towards democracyÓ in a footnote to the closing lines of 
CapitalÕs final substantive chapter (C, p. 655, n. 59), in which Piketty emphasizes the need, 
Òif democracy is someday to regain control of capitalism,Ó for the Òconcrete institutions in 
which democracy and capitalism are embodiedÓ to be Òreinvented again and againÓ (C, p. 
570).26 There are also sympathetic references to the work of Amartya Sen, albeit only rather 
briefly, and with one of his two references to Sen being connected not with SenÕs 
philosophical work on inequality and distributive justice but with his work, alongside Joseph 
Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fittousi, on a French government report examining alternative 
aggregate measures to replace GDP in the measure of economic performance and social 
progress (C, p. 603, n. 25).27 
The political philosopher to whom PikettyÕs substantive views about inequality most 
closely approximates, though, is certainly John Rawls. Indeed, I want to advance the claim 
that, although this may be a rather underappreciated aspect of PikettyÕs overall argument, 
there is a high degree to which PikettyÕs substantive normative view is in its specifics a 
remarkably Rawlsian one. Most explicitly, there is PikettyÕs claim that inequality is 
permissible only if it Òbenefits in particular the most disadvantaged groups in society,Ó28 
which of course closely echoes RawlsÕs difference principle. Moreover, in discussing the 
central idea of Òcommon utilityÓ invoked in Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen passed by FranceÕs revolutionary National Constituent Assembly in 1789, 
Piketty suggests that Òone reasonable interpretation is that social inequalities are acceptable 
only if they are in the interest of all and in particular of the most disadvantaged social 
groupsÓ, noting that Òthe Òdifference principleÓ introduced by the US philosopher John Rawls 
in his A Theory of Justice is similar in intentÓ (C, p. 480, and p. 631, fn. 22).  
Moving beyond these explicit endorsements of a broadly Rawlsian approach to 
inequality, the Rawlsian nature of PikettyÕs view goes deeper, in that as we shall see PikettyÕs 
core normative complaints against inequality seem to be that it undermines equality of 
opportunity in the next generation and that it undercuts the political equality needed for a 
well-functioning democracy, in addition to the claims that inequality is often 
counterproductive in terms of growth and economic efficiency. These are in essence 
                                                
26Rancire 2005, published in English as Rancire 2006.  
27Stiglitz, Sen, and Fittousi, 2009.  
28Piketty, quoted in OÕNeill and Pearce 2014, p. 107.  
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equivalent to the case against inequality associated with RawlsÕs commitment to the Fair 
Value of Political Liberties (that is, as a subordinate condition of his first principle of justice), 
and with his principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (that is, the first part of RawlsÕs second 
principle of justice), in addition to the objection to inequality associated with the difference 
principle. Thus, while Piketty talks only about the difference principle when he discusses the 
Òsimilarity in intentÓ between his approach and RawlsÕs, the structural alignment of his 
normative commitments and RawlsÕs runs much deeper than Piketty may realize. I shall take 
in PikettyÕs main objections to inequality in turn, following the equivalent ordering of 
RawlsÕs principles of justice, taking first the democratic objection to inequality, and second 
his meritocratic objection, before returning briefly to the Òcommon utilityÓ objection to 
inequality, which Piketty holds in two separate and distinct varieties. 
 
 
A.  The Democratic Objection to Inequality 
 
In his influential and strongly positive review of Capital, the Financial Times economic 
commentator Martin Wolf charged that a shortcoming of PikettyÕs book was that Òit does not 
deal with why soaring inequality É matters. Essentially, Piketty simply assumes that it 
does.Ó29 PikettyÕs response to WolfÕs slightly uncharitable charge bears examination: ÒÉ 
when it is really extreme, inequality can be a real threat for our democratic institutions. I am 
not saying that we are there yet, particularly in Europe, but I think that on the other side of 
the Atlantic this has become an issue. The influence of private money in politics has become 
quite frightening. In Europe, the rise in inequality has been less extreme, and we also have 
rules governing the financing of political parties. These rules are important, and we should 
not take them for granted. I would say that, while markets and private property are great at 
producing innovation and producing new wealth, extreme inequality of income and wealth is 
not only useless for growth but is bad for the basic working of our democratic institutions.Ó30 
The democratic objection to inequality that Piketty adumbrates here is best read not simply as 
an ad hoc or improvised response to Wolf. Rather, it fits closely with what Piketty says at the 
                                                
29Wolf 2014. 
30Piketty quoted in OÕNeill and Pearce 2014, pp. 107Ð8. It is worth noting that these claims about the 
disturbingly oligarchic character of U.S. politics were made even before the 2016 presidential election. 
On U.S. oligarchy, see Gilens 2012 and Bartels 2016. On RawlsÕs own worries regarding how 
democratic polities can slide into oligarchy, see: Rawls 1999, pp. 198Ð9; Rawls 2001, pp. 137Ð8; 
OÕNeill 2012, pp. 77Ð8, 81Ð4. 
 17 
very start of the book about the need for Òdemocracy to retain control over capitalism and 
ensure that the general interest takes precedence over private interestsÓ (C, p. 1), what he says 
later on about the threat that significant inequalities of wealth create Òthe risk of drift toward 
oligarchyÓ (C, p. 514), and his message in a section with the striking title: ÒThe Rentier, 
Enemy of DemocracyÓ (C, p. 422).  
 
B.  The Meritocratic Objection to Inequality 
 
One of the glories of Capital is its rich and evocative engagement with a number of novels 
and films that depict what life was like under conditions of extreme inequality, such as 
existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain and in France. The purpose of 
this engagement is, of course, not mere ornamentation, but rendering vivid what is so 
grotesquely unattractive about such societies of ÒpatrimonialÓ wealth. In the world of Jane 
Austen or Honor de Balzac, wealth came not from effort or talent or innovation, but from 
social positioning, and the hope of marrying into an already wealthy family. Hence Piketty 
presents us with the case of the scoundrel Vautrin in BalzacÕs Pre Goriot, telling the 
(relatively) impoverished law student Rastignac, a scion of the impecunious minor regional 
aristocracy, that, as Piketty puts it, Òit is illusory to think that social success can be achieved 
through study, talent and effortÓ (C, p. 239). Instead, in a society of deep wealth inequality, 
where the rentiers rule, if Rastignac wants to find any kind of social advancement then he has 
to find himself an heiress. Or to take a lower-brow example, we may consider, as Piketty also 
does, DisneyÕs The Aristocats (a great favorite of my own children) set during the waning 
years of the Belle poque just before the outbreak of the First World War, in which the 
eccentric heiress Adlade de Bonnefamille finds herself so flush with capital income that she 
can think only to lavish it on piano and painting lessons for her cats, and her butler Edgar can 
only see a promising future for himself if he can supplant the cats in her affections and hope 
to inherit her estate (C, pp. 365Ð6). 
These worlds of extreme wealth inequality are normatively repellent, as they create 
social systems in which human creative drives and excellences, talent and ability, become of 
only marginal significance, and instead social maneuvering to become a beneficiary of 
inherited wealth is the order of the day. Such worlds have a kind of deadening, dehumanizing 
quality, as Òcapital reproduces itself faster than output increases. The past devours the 
future.Ó (C, p. 571). Men and women become not the creators of their own fates, but merely 
the beneficiaries of frozen wealth from years gone by. By contrast, Òour democratic societies 
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rest on a meritocratic worldview, or at any rate a meritocratic hope, by which I mean a 
society in which inequality is based more on merit and effort than on kinship and rentsÓ (C, p. 
422).  
Piketty evidently holds that a democratic, relatively egalitarian society is to be 
preferred over a society of rentiers not least because there is a Òmeritocratic hopeÓ at the very 
heart of how we think about a justifiable socio-economic system. Just as Rawls endorses a 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, so Piketty sees meritocracy as at the center of a 
vision of democratic justice. But, more even than this similarity, it is striking that, again like 
Rawls, Piketty is a moderate rather than an extremist believer in meritocracy. Just as Rawls 
rejects the view he calls ÒLiberal Equality,Ó in which the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity is unaccompanied by the difference principle, and where ÒmeritÓ-based 
inequalities are thereby allowed to grow to whatever magnitude the economic system will 
sustain, so too Piketty rejects the Òmeritocratic extremismÓ that he sees at work in the 
ideological justifications for the emergence of the supermanagers (C, pp. 418Ð20) 31. Both 
Rawls and Piketty approvingly refer to the work of Michael Young who, in his dystopian 
fable The Rise of the Meritocracy,32 imagines a future society of (what Piketty would call) 
Òmeritocratic extremism,Ó in which there is no place (as Rawls would put it) for the Òidea of 
fraternityÓ and in which, as Rawls imagines such a society, the Òsocial bases of self-respectÓ 
would be undermined, through the message that society would send to its less successful 
members that their lack of material success was the outward sign of a lack of inner value.33 
PikettyÕs discussion of Michael Young shows his vivid fear of an outcome he sees taking 
shape in the U.S. in particular, in which society is so acutely hard on its ÒlosersÓ Òbecause it 
seeks to justify domination on the grounds of justice, virtue and meritÓ (C, p. 416). Here, as 
elsewhere, Rawls and Piketty march in surprisingly close alignment. 
An economist who saw socio-economic inequality in purely distributive terms might 
look to offer a simple formula showing the Òoptimal level of inequality.Ó Piketty by contrast 
is much more of a social egalitarian. When its somewhat inchoate elements are brought 
together, PikettyÕs account of the normative significance of inequality registers a diversity of 
egalitarian considerations that include concerns about both procedural unfairness and 
oligarchic political domination in both the political and economic spheres, and, particularly in 
his critique of hypermeritocracy, a concern for the harms to status and self-respect that can 
                                                
31See Rawls 1999, ¤¤12, 17, pp. 57Ð65, 86Ð93. 
32Young 1958; see also Young 2001. 
33Rawls 1999, ¤17, esp. pp. 90Ð1 and ch. IX, pp. 450Ð514. 
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come with particular institutionalized forms of economic inequality. He is, in philosophical 
terms, a relational rather than a distributive egalitarian, and when its elements are marshaled 
together and brought into focus, his pluralistic view of the normative significance of 
inequality falls within the remit of the view I have described elsewhere as Ònon-intrinsic 
egalitarianism.Ó34 
 
C.  Two Varieties of the ÒCommon UtilityÓ Objection to  
  Inequality 
 
In the epigraph to Capital, Piketty quotes Article 1 of the 1789 French declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which declares that Òsocial distinctions can be based only 
on common utilityÓ (C, p. 1). In other words, the guiding idea that Piketty wants at the very 
start of the book is that, in general, socio-economic inequalities stand in need of justification. 
As he says later, we should follow Article 1 of the declaration in holding that Òequality is the 
norm, and inequality is justifiable only if based on Ôcommon utilityÕÓ (C, p. 480). While the 
framers of the declaration were thinking of the special orders and privileges of the Ancien 
Rgime, Òone can interpret the phrase more broadly, however. One reasonable interpretation 
is that social inequalities are acceptable only if they are in the interest of all and in particular 
of the most disadvantaged social groupsÓ (C, p. 480, my italics). 
My suggestion is that Piketty is fully serious about both sides of this disjunction: he 
thinks that extreme inequality is unjustifiable both because it goes against the general interest 
and because in particular it goes against the interests of the least well-off. The first variety of 
the Òcommon utilityÓ objection to inequality is relatively uncontroversial: to return to his 
response to Wolf, Piketty points out that that Òwhen inequality is too extreme, itÕs not useful 
any more for growth.Ó35 This is a view that might at one time have seemed unusual for an 
economist to hold, but it has now become something close to the economic orthodoxy as the 
growth-retarding effects of inequality, operating through the suppression of aggregate 
demand, and a reduction of economic opportunities of the more disadvantaged, have become 
clearer to discern in the workings of the economy. Indeed, we have reached a point when 
even official OECD publications argue that Òhigher inequality drags down economic 
                                                
34For the characterization of non-intrinsic egalitarianism, see OÕNeill 2008a, esp. 121Ð34. See also: Rawls 2001, 
pp. 130Ð1; Scanlon 1996; OÕNeill 2013, 2016c. For loci classici of recent social or relational 
egalitarianism, see: Anderson 1999; Scheffler 200, 2005. See also Neuhouser 2013, 2014. 
35OÕNeill and Pearce 2014, p. 107. 
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growth,Ó and so this variety of the Òcommon utilityÓ argument can be seen as a 
straightforward expression of economic common sense.36 
PikettyÕs position, though, goes beyond accepting only the ÒaggregateÓ version of the 
Òcommon utilityÓ objection to inequality. At the end of Capital, where Piketty is defending 
the virtues of his own brand of quantitative, historical social science, his closing claim is that 
Òrefusing to deal with numbers rarely serves the interest of the least well-offÓ (C, p. 577). 
This fits entirely with the central idea of the need for justification to the least well-off 
members of society, and with PikettyÕs normative interpretation of the founding document of 
the French revolution. As a historian and economist rather than a political philosopher, 
Piketty does not have all that much interest in the details of philosophical debates about 
inequality and social justice, but the basic alignment of his normative outlook is made fully 
vivid at both the opening and the close of Capital. 
 
 
 
VI.  WHY PIKETTY MATTERS TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:  
 REFOCUSING BEYOND THE TRENTES GLORIEUSES 
 
A great deal of discussion in political philosophy since Rawls has unthinkingly inherited a 
kind of middle twentieth century framing, in which Òincome and wealthÓ can be treated as a 
combined category, rather than treated distinctly, and in which there is often an unexamined 
assumption that inequality is mostly to do with labor market income. Hence there is in the 
discipline a great deal more discussion of how to reward effort and talent in the labor market, 
of marginal income tax rates, and so on, with much less on the taxation and regulation of 
capital holdings, inheritance, and capital transfers.37 That focus clearly needs to change in 
light of PikettyÕs work. We are no longer in the territory of mid twentieth century 
assumptions about the basic functioning of the economy: a world of high growth, moderate 
                                                
36See OECD 2015, which makes the case that Òthe rise in income inequality between 1985 and 2005 É is 
estimated to have knocked 4.7 percentage points off cumulative growth between 1990 and 2010, on 
average across OECD countries for which long time series are available.Ó See also Stiglitz 2012, 2016 
and Miliband 2016.  
37This is of course not to say that work on these topics is wholly absent. For leading examples of Òasset-based 
egalitarianismÓ see, for example: Ackerman and Alstott 1999; Ackerman, Alstott, and Van Parijs 2005. 
See also: Wright 2010; Atkinson 2015. 
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rather than extreme inequality, and a stable and relatively low value for α. Those days have 
gone, and the discipline of political philosophy needs to catch up to that fact. 
PikettyÕs Capital throws down the gauntlet for political philosophers who are interested 
in the relationship between the theory and practice of social justice. It shows us that capitalist 
economies are structurally recalcitrant to reform in the direction of greater equality, and it 
shows us that we need to think much more about the ownership and control of capital. I shall 
turn now to an examination of some of the details of what this post-Piketty egalitarian agenda 
for political philosophy and public policy might look like. 
 
  
VII.  OVERCOMING INEQUALITY: REDISTRIBUTION AND PREDISTRIBUTION 
 
A.  PikettyÕs Proposals: The Global Wealth Tax and Beyond 
 
A common reaction to PikettyÕs work, especially among egalitarians, is one of resignation or 
even despair. The sardonic good humor and caution optimism displayed by Piketty himself 
can seem oddly out of place against the background picture of capitalismÕs dynamics. The 
sense that PikettyÕs book should be seen as a deeply pessimistic one is brought into full focus 
when we consider the single policy proposal for which he is best known: that is, the idea of a 
progressive global wealth tax (see C, pp. 515Ð39). Such a tax would involve unprecedented 
levels of cooperation between international tax authorities, alongside a massive shift in the 
level of detail in reporting the ownership and transfer of both financial and non-financial 
wealth. Such a proposal sounds like pie in the sky: a wonderful policy if we somehow had a 
magic wand to change the nature of both the world financial system and of its various (often 
highly competitive) fiscal systems overnight, but a position inaccessible any time soon from 
our current circumstances. If we imagine states that could enact the policy that Piketty 
endorses, then we seem at the same time to be imagining a world in which the concrete 
problems of unequal power and unequal political influence that are created by large economic 
inequalities are somehow dissolved. PikettyÕs hoped-for fiscal fix would seem to involve an 
impossible act of political bootstrapping.38 
However, commentators have been too quick both to reduce the implications of 
PikettyÕs book to the headline proposals of more aggressive fiscal transfers, and to accuse 
                                                
38For related concerns, see Ronzoni 2015. 
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him of utopianism in putting too much faith in such a solution. Piketty himself is not nave 
about the short-run possibilities for a technocratic fix for runaway inequality through the 
actions of some international fiscal authority, seeing his global wealth tax proposal in 
strategic terms as a Òworthwhile reference point, a standard against which alternative 
proposals can be measuredÓ (C, p. 515). Moreover, and more importantly, he also has a more 
ambitious agenda, speaking of the need for Òthe development of new forms of property and 
democratic control of capitalÓ, with regard to which Ònew forms of participation and 
governance remain to be inventedÓ (C, p. 569). Such an agenda already has some roots within 
egalitarian political philosophy, and the best hope for its further development resides in an 
interdisciplinary research effort that combines insights from different traditions. 
Instead of giving too much attention to the global wealth tax proposal, it is more 
illuminating to read Piketty as calling for a broad and comprehensive research program that 
would involve finding new ways in which the balance between democracy and capitalism can 
be reset. Piketty, whose contempt for the Òchildish passion for mathematics and for purely 
theoretical and often highly ideological speculationÓ (C, p. 32) of contemporary economics is 
both creditable and amusing for someone of his disciplinary background and training, seems 
to realize that this can only be a broad-based research program across the social sciences, 
incorporating insights from history, sociology, law, political science, and philosophy as well 
as economics itself. 
 
 
B.  Piketty, Meade, and Predistribution39 
 
Before saying more about where the road from PikettyÕs book should lead, I want first to take 
a step back, and to discuss the relationship between PikettyÕs weighty volume and an earlier, 
contrastingly concise book by the economist James Meade. Published fifty years before 
PikettyÕs Capital in the Twenty-First Century, MeadeÕs 1964 book, Efficiency, Equality and 
the Ownership of Property is an astonishingly prescient book that is centrally concerned with 
the same problems of inequality that drive PikettyÕs work.40  
Where Piketty has a team of multinational researchers armed with a wealth of historical 
data, Meade had to make do with no more than some inspired armchair hunches about the 
                                                
39This sub-section draws on OÕNeill 2016a. 
40Meade 1964. See also OÕNeill 2015. 
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evolution of capitalism, made all the more remarkable by the fact that he was writing at the 
very high watermark of the Trentes Glorieuses, at a time when the labor share of economic 
returns was high, and inequality was historically low. Gazing into his crystal ball, Meade 
predicted that the relentless consequence of technological advances would be greatly to 
increase the productivity of capital relative to labor. He also suspected that (as Piketty and his 
colleagues were to go on to demonstrate) inequalities in capital returns between large and 
small investors would lead to the increasing growth of inequality even among the holders of 
capital.41  
These twin forces of divergence would lead, Meade thought, to what would be a 
horrific social outcome, identical in its main features to PikettyÕs prediction of a return to a 
new Belle poque. Meade named his dystopia ÒThe Brave New CapitalistsÕ Paradise.Ó Here 
is his vivid description of it: 
 
But what of the future? É  There would be a limited number of exceedingly wealthy 
property owners; the proportion of the working population required to man the 
extremely profitable automated industries would be small; wage rates would thus be 
depressed; there would have to be a large expansion of the production of the labor-
intensive goods and services which were in demand by the few multi-multi-multi-
millionaires; we would be back in a super-world of an immiserized proletariat and of 
butlers, footmen, kitchen maids, and other hangers-on. Let us call this the Brave New 
CapitalistsÕ Paradise. 
 
It is to me a hideous outlook. What could we do about it?42  
 
MeadeÕs problemÑthat is, the problem of what could be done to prevent the realization of 
the Brave New CapitalistsÕ ParadiseÑis in effect the same as PikettyÕs problem of how to 
stop the emergence of a new Belle poque. MeadeÕs solution to this problem was an 
intriguing one. He thought that the state should take any reasonable means necessary to 
prevent this dystopian outcome, pursuing three strategies simultaneously. A single egalitarian 
aim should be realized by a plurality of egalitarian means. MeadeÕs vision was of a new kind 
of egalitarian social democracy, using a novel combination of both socialist and popular 
capitalist institutions to create a society that combined economic dynamism with a huge 
reduction in economic inequality. 
                                                
41Meade 1964, pp. 24Ð6, 44Ð5. 
42Meade 1964, p. 33. 
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Firstly, the traditional forms of redistribution through the welfare state should be 
protected, both with regard to transfers to the badly-off and the provision of collective public 
services. But Meade thought that no strategy that did not address the underlying pattern of 
ownership and control of wealth would go far enough. Public policy could not be concerned 
only with the flow of income streams, but with the sources of wealth from which they came. 
Traditional methods of redistribution simply did not go deep enough, dealing with the 
symptoms of underlying inequality, rather than providing a more fundamental cure by 
restructuring patterns of individual and collective ownership within the economy. Only the 
more fundamental strategy could ensure, stably and in the long run, that the increase in the 
capital share of national income would be made to work for everyone, and not just for a 
narrow class of plutocrats. Egalitarian strategy had to be proactive, rather than merely 
defensive. 
MeadeÕs view was that attacking fundamental inequalities of wealth had therefore to 
involve an additional double-barreled strategy, consisting in the creation of a range of private 
and public institutions and policies, which he brought under the headings of (i) a property-
owning democracy and (ii) liberal socialism. The stateÕs function in shaping the economy 
should instead be to restructure the rules of the capitalist game from the very start, through 
these varieties of both private and public forms of what IÕll call Òcapital predistribution.Ó43  
MeadeÕs property-owning democracy involves, in effect, changing the nature of 
property rights such that wealth is much less easily transferable across generations, subjecting 
it to high rates of taxation with regard to both inheritance and gifts inter vivos. Wealth would 
be dispersed across the population, with individual capital holdings for all viewed as an 
entitlement of citizenship, and the use of a myriad of mechanisms that would spread the 
returns to capital as broadly as possible. Such mechanisms could take a large number of 
different forms, including Òthe encouragement of financial intermediaries in which small 
savings can be pooled for investment in high-earning risk bearing securities; measures to 
promote employee share schemes whereby workers can gain a property interest in business 
firms; and measures whereby municipally built houses can be bought on the installment 
principle by their occupants.Ó44 The goal would be both to spread capital returns widely 
across society, and to overcome the forces for divergence between larger and smaller 
investors. 
                                                
43See OÕNeill and Williamson 2012b.  
44Meade 1964, p. 59. 
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This Òproperty-owning democracyÓ was, though, just half of MeadeÕs strategy of (in 
my terms) Òcapital predistribution.Ó The other halfÑhis ÒSocialist StateÓÑinvolved the 
creation of forms of collective, democratic wealth. Meade envisaged the creation of public 
institutions akin to the sovereign wealth funds that have come to play an increasingly 
important role in the world economy, such as the Alaskan Permanent Fund or, most 
impressively, the Norwegian Statens Pensjonsfond Utland (SPU), a collective investment 
vehicle that owns roughly 1% of global equities.45 Such forms of public and democratic 
wealth ownership could be used to fund a citizensÕ income (as in the Alaskan case), or in any 
other democratically authorized way that allowed the socialization of increasing returns to 
capital, and the decoupling of individual life-chances from excessive dependence on 
outcomes in the labor market.  
Unlike Rawls, whose own influences from Meade are clear even from the names which 
he gives to different kinds of socio-economic regime, Meade did not think that we need to 
choose between private and public forms of capital predistribution (and neither did he think 
that either strategy was a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, the traditional welfare 
state).46 Instead, Meade believed that a more egalitarian future would involve the state doing 
three thingsÑ(i) strengthening the provision of public goods and income transfers through 
the traditional mechanisms of the social state, whilst simultaneously pursuing Òcapital 
predistributionÓ in both its (ii) individual and (iii) collective forms.  Meade thought that what 
we need Òis a combination of measures for some socialization of net property ownership and 
for a more equal distribution of the property that is privately owned,Ó47 taken as measures Òto 
supplement rather than to replace existing welfare state policies.Ó48  
It is only now, fifty years after the publication of MeadeÕs prescient classic, that the full 
force of his diagnosis of capitalismÕs inegalitarian ills has become clear. It may also be time 
to pay more attention to his proposals for how those ills might be cured. This brings us back 
to Piketty, who describes himself as Òfollowing in the footstepsÓ (C, p. 582) of Meade (and of 
MeadeÕs student and PikettyÕs collaborator, Tony Atkinson). Piketty elaborates on the 
relationship of his thinking to MeadeÕs proposals as follows: ÒJames Meade, just like me, 
believed that progressive taxation and the development of other forms of property 
relationships and of other forms of governance are complementary institutions. In the book I 
                                                
45On the Alaskan Permanent Fund, see Widerquist and Howard 2012. 
46See Rawls 2001 and OÕNeill and Williamson 2012a.  
47Meade 1964, p. 71. 
48Ibid., p. 75. 
 26 
probably place too much emphasis on progressive taxation, but I do talk about the 
development of new forms of governance and property structure, but probably not 
sufficiently.Ó49 Along similar lines, in his post-Capital writing, Piketty has returned to what 
one might describe as the unwritten, Meadean parts of his argument for institutional change 
to combat inequality, allowing that ÒI may have devoted too much attention to progressive 
capital taxation and too little attention to a number of institutional evolutions that could prove 
equally important, such as the development of alternative forms of property arrangements and 
participatory governance.Ó50  
This agenda is firmly in a territory shared with, and already partially developed by, 
egalitarian political philosophy. Its leading expression thus far in the twenty-first century is in 
the magisterial final book of the late Tony Atkinson, a figure midway between Meade and 
Piketty in a direct intellectual lineage. AtkinsonÕs Inequality: What Can Be Done? can be 
viewed as an elaboration of the egalitarian institutional agenda begun by Meade, combining 
redistribution with both public and private forms of capital predistribution.51 Where Atkinson 
goes even further than Meade in terms advocating a pluralism of means is in also finding 
space, among fifteen concrete proposals for creating a more equal society, to include for 
proposals to strengthen union bargaining and to support wages, something that Meade was 
reluctant to do. (This difference may reflect the different prevailing economic circumstances, 
as much as any deeper theoretical disagreement.) 
 
 
VIII.  AN EGALITARIAN INSTITUTIONAL AGENDA FOR POLITICAL  
 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
  
A.  How Do You Solve a Problem Like the Rise in α? 
 
What, then, should a post-Piketty agenda for egalitarian political philosophy and public 
policy look like? In order to answer this question, one needs a map of the possible policy 
options for dealing with the growth in inequality. One fundamental issue relates to the 
                                                
49OÕNeill and Pearce 2014, p. 108.  
50Piketty 2015b, p. 87. 
51Atkinson 2015. See also Atkinson 2014 and Piketty 2015f. The structural similarities between Atkinson (2015) 
and Meade (1964) run deep, although AtkinsonÕs book is much the more detailed and comprehensive 
(as well as being up to date). Atkinson remarked to me that he wrote his book Òwith a copy of JamesÕs 
book in front of meÓ (personal correspondence, 4 January 2016). 
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normative assessment of two different kinds of responses to the likely significant growth of 
the capital share, α, in the twenty-first century. Put simply, the question is whether to try to 
beat it, or join it; resist it, or embrace it? Should egalitarian public policy be concerned with 
retarding or reversing the growth in α, or should it instead accept or even welcome the 
growth in α, whilst finding other ways to ensure that a growing capital share does not lead to 
the creation of a society of excessively objectionable inequalities? Now, this is not to say that 
the choice between resisting and accommodating the growth of α need be a wholly exclusive 
one at the level of policy (in fact, the pursuit of a ÒpureÓ strategy would seem to be extremely 
unlikely as a matter of both politics and policy), and we may judge that a radically pluralist 
egalitarian strategy such as AtkinsonÕs presents the best way forward, but it does mean that 
we need to bear in mind the normative costs and benefits of two conceptually distinct 
approaches to thinking about the future of the capital share. 
 
 
B.  Resisting the Rise in the Capital Share 
 
One strategy for egalitarians to consider would be to try to stop or even reverse the rise in α. 
Recall the Piketty Equation from section II, which demonstrates that there would be rather 
different ways of doing this. One could target policies that looked to reduce the return on 
capital, r, or to reduce the savings rate, s, or which sought to drive up the underlying level of 
growth, g. I will not have much to say about the third of those options, for three reasons: first, 
because the level of growth has been targeted by politicians for so long, such that of the three 
options this is in some way the most familiar and unremarkable of the three (although 
nevertheless it is remarkable to see the degree to which democratic politicians have in recent 
years been pursuing self-defeating policies of economic austerity that throw out even the 
simplest common sense of pro-growth policies52); secondly because the scope for shifting the 
underlying growth level is likely to be both relatively limited and hence to have only a 
restricted influence on the level of α; and thirdly because we may have strong reasons to 
favor a steady-state economy, or even to target Òdegrowth,Ó given environmental constrains. 
So instead I want to concentrate on r and s, examining what policies could do to target either 
the rate of return on capital or the savings rate.  
 
                                                
52See: Blyth 2013; Stiglitz 2016. 
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1. Reducing r? Approaches to Reducing the Rate of Return to Capital 
 
It may sound perverse to look to reduce the profitability of business enterprises, but that 
sense of perversity soon evaporates when one considers the equilibrium effects of some 
policy measures to do so. In PikettyÕs treatment of ÒRhenish capitalismÓ and the German 
social model, he discusses the way in which German forms of corporate governanceÑwith 
workers on corporate boards and the ÒcodeterminationÓ of industrial policy 
(ÒMitbestimmungÓ)Ñallows more of the value of firms to be captured by stakeholders other 
than shareholders, as interestingly demonstrated by the differences between the stock market 
value and Òbook valueÓ of German firms. In such a model of capitalism, a lower market 
valuation for corporate assets is not associated with Òa lower social valuationÓ; in fact, quite 
the opposite (C, pp. 145Ð6). So in thinking here about ways of reducing the capital share, and 
thereby driving down inequality, there is a need to engage with the normative assessment of 
the background institutional ordering within which capitalist enterprises are embedded, and 
for political philosophy to engage more fully with issues of corporate governance, 
codetermination, and the rich discussions in political economy regarding the Òvarieties of 
capitalism.Ó53 
When considering the form of Òsocial ownershipÓ involved in the German model of 
capitalism, one particular issue that should come immediately into focus is the status and 
significance of trade unions. Egalitarian political philosophy has had surprisingly little to say 
about the normative assessment of trade unions, yet these are the organizations that have 
historically been the most significant actors both in making sure that labor receives its share 
of the social product (that is, stopping the rise in α) and, through their connection with 
political parties, in taming capitalism by democratic means. There is a rich territory here 
regarding the operation and regulation of unions, and their links to parties and partisanship, 
for political philosophers to explore more fully.54 
Efforts to reduce r through these kinds of Òlabor predistribution,Ó whether through the 
political agency of unions or through the operation of corporatist models of economic 
                                                
53An important contribution to the political philosophy of codetermination comes from Waheed Hussain. See 
Hussain 2009, 2012. 
54See: Cohen and Rogers 1992; Cohen and Rogers 1995; White 1998; White, Butt and OÕNeill 2012. On 
arguments for change to employment relations to give employees more power in the workplace 
(proposals which might in some cases help to raise the labor share of income) see, e.g.: Cohen 1989; 
Hsieh 2005, 2007, 2012; OÕNeill 2008b. 
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management, present one kind of option for further exploration. Another, perhaps more 
simple, approach would simply be to think more about how corporate profits are taxed, and to 
consider that there are standard redistributive fiscal means for reducing r, to be considered 
alongside these more institutionally complicated predistributive mechanisms.55 Here, though, 
any discussion of corporate taxation or business taxation within political philosophy needs to 
proceed from a careful appreciation of the empirical complexities involved in the 
implementation of taxes, in particular the capacity of businesses to shift the incidence of 
taxation onto workers or consumers. There is no doubt that the tax system can be an 
important means for reducing excessive returns to capital, but it needs to be thought about in 
full engagement with our best empirical models of how tax systems function in practice, and 
with an eye to the possibility of unintended consequences (as when, for example, a rise in 
business taxation might be passed on directly to workers in the form of lower wages).56  
 
 
2.  Savings, Inheritance, and Inequality 
 
The optimal social savings rate, s, is a matter of considerable normative complexity, 
connected closely to difficult issues of intergenerational justice. One thing to be borne in 
mind when considering the normative desirability of policy interventions designed to target 
savings is that, as regards inequality, our interest is often not so much with the aggregate 
savings rate, as with the particular distribution of savings. If one considers the scheme of 
aggressive inheritance and capital transfer taxes endorsed by both Meade and Rawls, one 
should remember that their primary purpose is to reduce inequalities in the intergenerational 
transmission of inherited advantage, rather than to reduce savings overall. Yet it is worth 
bearing in mind that such taxes would not be without their consequences for individualsÕ 
propensities to save rather than to consume, and these consequences would have to be kept in 
view when undertaking a clear-eyed assessment of the normative justifiability of different 
forms of capital or wealth taxation.  
Also of great relevance here, when one considers the place of savings in an institutional 
approach towards creating a more equal society, are the background rules of inheritance and 
bequest, which tend to be entirely different as between ÒcontinentalÓ and ÒAnglo-AmericanÓ 
                                                
55See for example Dietsch 2015. For a range of philosophical treatments of taxation, see OÕNeill and Orr 
forthcoming.   
56There is an excellent discussion of tax incidence in Piketty 2015a, pp. 30Ð2. 
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models, with the former involving a model of regulated inheritance in which family members 
are entitled to more-or-less fixed proportions of a relativeÕs estate, whereas the latter involves 
a more individualized model of voluntary bequests.57 There is also a need to think about 
whether systems of inheritance taxation should be focused, as they currently are in many 
jurisdictions, on the magnitude of the estate or, as both Rawls and Meade advocated, whether 
they should instead be Òrecipient-oriented,Ó with the tax system thereby providing incentives 
for large fortunes to be split between a number of smaller individual beneficiaries, rather than 
passed on largely intact.58 
In his discussion of merit and inheritance, Piketty mentionsÑwith something 
approaching approvalÑmile DurkheimÕs prediction that Òmodern democratic society would 
not put up for long with the existence of inherited wealth and would ultimately see to it that 
ownership of property ended with deathÓ (C, p. 422). 59 It may be that a view approaching the 
radical nature of DurkheimÕs proposal should be under discussion as we work through the 
problem of how to find a social solution to the problems of runaway inequality. Piketty 
remarks of the problem of inheritance, which had seemed so vivid to Durkheim writing 
during the years of the high Belle poque, that Òit may be that the wars of the twentieth 
century merely postponed the problem to the twenty-firstÓ (C, p. 621, n. 55). It is a twenty-
first century problem of both urgency and complexity, a solution to which cannot be found by 
economists alone, but which raises deep and irreducibly normative questions of social justice.  
 
 
C. Embracing the Rise in the Capital Share 
 
A wholly different approach would be to look to harness the growth of α for more egalitarian 
ends. This sort of approach might seem in some ways to represent a more long-run strategy 
than that involved in trying to retard the growth of α for, as the technological frontier 
(hopefully) continues to advance, it is likely that capital-intensive forms of production will 
increasingly crowd out labor-intensive forms of production. Seen under a certain light, the 
growth of the capital share is one of the crowning achievements of civilization, and as a 
remarkable collective achievement from which we can all benefit.60 It took the destruction of 
                                                
57See Beckert 2008. 
58See discussions in: Cunliffe and Erreygers 2012; Lamb 2014; OÕNeill 2007; White 2008a. 
59In Durkheim [1893] 2013.  
60For an argument on the role of our collective technological inheritance, see Alperovitz and Daly 2008. 
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two world wars to drive down α and temporarily to shift the balance back towards labor from 
capital, but we should hardly favor a lower level of α if it can only be brought at the expense 
of the destruction of the hard-won achievements of previous generations, as embedded in the 
infrastructure of our societies. One can in one respect see the rise in α as a welcome peace 
dividend, achieved through the avoidance of the kind of systematic self-destruction 
characteristic of the 1914Ð45 period, and potentially available for the benefit of all if only we 
can solve the political and policy puzzles of finding a more equitable way to share the 
advantages that it brings. As Piketty and his co-author Emmanuel Saez put it, ÒHigh capital 
intensity É is not bad in itself. After all, it would be good to have an infinite quantity of 
robots producing most of the output, so that we can devote more time to leisure activities. 
The problem is twofold: Can we all find jobs as a robot designer (or in leisure-related 
activities), and who owns the robots?Ó61 
As weÕve discussed, both Meade and Rawls outlined strategies for thinking about what 
it would be to share the benefits of a rising capital share in a justifiably egalitarian fashion, 
through forms of what I have here called Òcapital predistribution,Ó whereby a right (either 
individual or collective) over a certain range of productive resources is conceived of as a 
basic entitlement of all citizens. For Rawls, this led to the rival visions of either a Òproperty-
owning democracy,Ó with widely-dispersed private capital holdings, or a form of Òliberal 
socialism,Ó in which most productive capital would be held by the state, with control over 
specific parts of that collective capital devolved to private citizens. For Meade, the ideal at 
which to aspire was a combination of private and collective forms of property-ownership, 
with the coexistence of a number of mechanisms for facilitating individual capital 
investments (together with mechanisms for democratizing the benefits available currently 
onto to ÒsuperinvestorsÓ through state-regulated vehicles to manage aggregations of 
individual investments), alongside the development of a Ònational assetÓ or sovereign wealth 
fund. Given the increasing significance of sovereign wealth funds in the global economy, as 
documented by Piketty who calculates that such funds now own around 5 percent of global 
assets (C, p. 627, n. 43), this is one further respect in which MeadeÕs work was both 
insightful and prescient. 
There is a challenging task here for political philosophers in assessing the normative 
desirability of different paths towards socializing the gains associated with the long-run rise 
in the capital share. Alongside this are questions about how such socialized gains should be 
                                                
61Piketty and Saez 2014, p. 841.  
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distributed, whether by means of universal basic income, a basic capital entitlement, or via 
some other means.62 At the level of thinking about socio-economic regimes, there is as yet 
only the beginnings of a systematic assessment of whether we should prefer a property-
owning democracy, some form of liberal democratic socialism, or something closer to the 
complex hybrid system advocated by Meade. Or perhaps there are other, as yet undeveloped 
ways of thinking about a socio-economic regime that could manage to use the rise in α as a 
force for good rather than to have to shrink from it as a source of profound political anxiety. 
At a more fine-grained level, there is much to analyze as regards the legitimate operation and 
governance of sovereign wealth funds, with pressing questions of how they should be best 
funded, what kinds of investment strategies they should purse, and how citizens should be 
able to have some influence on how they are run.63 Answers to these questions will, either 
tacitly or explicitly, involve taking substantive positions on a number of controversial topics 
in normative political philosophy. If we hope that the discussion around the future of these 
institutions of collective wealth is conducted with a clear eye to the normative issues at stake, 
then it is the responsibility of political philosophers to engage carefully with these emerging 
debates. 
 
 
IX.  CONCLUSIONÑIN THE LONG-RUN, THE ECONOMIC  
 POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR GRANDCHILDREN 
 
There is one question about what the best short-to-medium run strategies for addressing 
inequality might be, and a separate question about how societies should reorganize 
themselves in the long-run to prevent the normatively grotesque outcome of a twenty-first 
century that could be significantly more inegalitarian than the nineteenth, with an 
overwhelming reversal of the civilizing gains of the more inclusive growth of the twentieth 
century. It may be that the answer to the first question could involve political strategies to 
arrest the growth of the capital share, α. But, in the longer-run, if we or our descendants are 
fortunate enough to inherit a future that has avoided a cataclysm of global capital destruction, 
then we need to think creatively and systematically about the possibility of socio-economic 
                                                
62See, e.g.: Ackerman and Alstott 1999; Van Parijs 1995; Ackerman, Alstott and Van Parijs 2005; Wright 2010; 
Atkinson 2015; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017. 
63As excellent places to start, see Cummine 2016 and White and Seth-Smith 2014. See also OÕNeill 2016b. 
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regimes that socialize the gains of rising capital-intensity, and we need moreover also to think 
about the conditions for political agency that could deliver us there.64  
In 1930, John Maynard Keynes imagined the ÒEconomic Possibilities for our 
Grandchildren,Ó conceiving of a society in the early twenty-first century in which the social 
benefits of increased capital intensive growth were widely dispersed, creating the possibility 
for a life of leisure and refinement for all. 65 Keynes did not reckon for the complicated social 
forces that have in general led societies to maintain high working hours even in the face of 
substantial advances in aggregate economic growth, and neither did he reckon for the role of 
distributive inequality in preventing the realization of the outcome he imagined. If we are to 
be as hopeful for our own grandchildren as Keynes was able to be in 1930, then one task for 
political philosophy will be to imagine the possibility of a future in which we have the 
political institutions that allow democracy to regain control of capitalism. A second task will 
be to come to see how such a future might be accessible from where we are, given a clear-
eyed understanding of capitalismÕs dynamics, and its stubborn tendency towards creating 
severe inequality. PikettyÕs work shows both why the first task is so important, and why the 
second task is so difficult. 
 
 
  
                                                
64I am here agreeing both with Ronzoni (2015, pp. 8Ð9) and to some extent with Waldron (2013). See also 
White 2015 and Ronzoni 2016 for connected points. For a good place to start on the theory of political 
agency, see White and Ypi 2011, 2016. 
65See Pecchi and Piga 2010, which reprints KeynesÕs 1930 essay; see also Keynes 2010, along with a number of 
commentaries from contemporary economists. See also Vrousalis 2015. 
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